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Fiat by Declaration - S. 92(10)(c) of The
British North America Act
PHINEAS SCHWARTZ

The British North America Act has never been praised for its
logical symmetry, careful divisions, or precise delineations. 1 Federalists and Centralists have both found sufficient material therein to
give content to their strictures; those who have shunned both camps
2
have been equally well supplied.
A key and critical section in an evaluation and appreciation of
the British North America Act is 92(10) which provides that the
Province shall have legislative jurisdiction over:
Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following
Classes:
(a) Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and
other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any
other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits
of the Province;
(b) Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or
Foreign Country;
(c) Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are
before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada
to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage
of Tvo or more of the Provinces.
(10) (c), as a superficial reading of the section will readily reveal,
allows parliament by unilateral declaration to except from the jur*Mr. Schwartz is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School. He
has been awarded the Wallace Nesbitt Students' Essay Prize.
1 John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton (1915), 18 D.L.R. 353 (P.C.).
2 See Norman McL. Rogers, The Compact Theory of Confederation (1931),
9 Can. Bar Rev. 395.
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isdiction of the provincial legislatures such works as it declares to be
"for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two
or more of the provinces", and thus Parliament itself assumes jurisdiction. Logically speaking, this federal power obviates any rigid
classification of federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction insofar
as Parliament may at any time take unto itself jurisdiction over a
great many matters which would otherwise fall within the provincial
scope. 3 Not only does this section cut down provincial jurisdiction
at the instance of the Dominion Parliament, but it also belies any
sincere assertion of equality between Dominion and Provinces; the
4
Provinces are nowhere given an equivalent authority.
A section of the scope and magnitude of 10(c) obviously raises
many difficult questions, particularly in the light of the long line of
cases asserting provincial powers and rights and delimiting the federal
authority in their favour. Unfortunately, insofar as decisions on
(10) (c) are concerned, the courts have successfully followed their
stated policy of not answering more than necessary; 5 further, while
the courts have been prepared to go to great lengths to avoid the
ticklish problems inherent in the section, Parliament has made this
task a simple one by claiming jurisdiction over a work under various
heads so that there are often ample grounds for decision without a
consideration of the declarations under 10 (c).6
Aside from problems of strict statutory construction, interpretation of 10(c) gives rise to the same problems inherent in the
construction of 91 general, the political problems of division of
authority, of centralism and federalism. In point of fact, there is in
the literal reading of 91 general and 92(10) (c) a great similarity.
Both sections appear to give jurisdiction to Parliament to make laws
affecting the general welfare of Canada, and indeed 10 (c) goes further
and allows the Dominion to control works for the benefit of two or
more of the provinces. While 91 general talks of law and 10(c)
speaks of works, both have as their touchstone the well being of the
body politic on the national scale.
Indeed, from an analytic point of view, we might even question
the very need for s. 92(10) (c) in the light of 91 general. Its manifest
purpose is obviously to allow Parliament to control works located
within a province when it is in the best interest of Canada or two
or more of the provinces so to do; yet it would appear that if this
3
cf. the famous "watertight compartment" formula of Lord Atkin in
A.-G. Canadav. A.-G. Ont., [19371 A.C. 326 at p. 354. See too, F. R. Scott, The
Special Nature of Canadian Federalism (1947), 13 Can. Jo. Econ. and Pol.
Sc. 13.
4 Consider also the Dominion power of disallowance, of appointment of
the lieutenant-governor, and the latter's power of reservation over provincial
legislation, etc.
5 Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 97 at
p. 109.
6
e.g., Van Buren Bridge Co. 'v. Madawaska (1959), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 763,
(N.B. Appeal Div.), where if the declaration had been considered, it would
have been found faulty.
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were the intent of the Fathers of Confederation, 7 the section is superfluous inasmuch as 91 general prima facie gives Parliament this
power. On this view, unless we are prepared to concede the draftsmen of the British North America Act an exceedingly large, if not
prophetic, amount of prescience, in the light of how 91 general has
been cut down, the section was designed as merely another repetitious
safeguard for the authority of the central legislature. On the other
hand, since 91 general gives as examples of the Dominion authority
specifically enumerated classes of subjects, there is validity in incorporating by virtue of 91(29) works which would otherwise be
under provincial jurisdiction, as a class explicitly under Parliament's
authority. Why, however, the section was not directly included
under s. 91 is somewhat of a mystery.
Against both sections equally the traditional warning of Lord
Atkinson about the general power is applicable:8
If the Parliament of Canada had authority to make laws applicable to
the whole Dominion in relation to matters which in each province are
substantially of local or private interest upon the assumption that these
matters also concern the peace, order, and good government of the
Dominion, there is hardly a subject upon which it might not legislate to
the exclusion of provincial legislation.
Indeed, Landreville J.9 applies this theme to a construction of the
scope of a declaration contained in the Atomic Energy Control Actlo
and proceeds to narrowly construe that declaration.
The attempts to limit the scope and effect of 10 (c) have focussed
on the procedure necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction, the degree
of precision required of the declaration, and, of course, the meaning
and scope of the term 'work' as used in 10(c) itself. Inherent in
this process is the articulation of a philosophy of dualism, whether the
duality of nation and province, or of capacity and authority.
Procedurally, 10(c) simply requires Parliament to make a
declaration, as a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction.
Whether this declaration need be explicit or may be implied is another
question considered by some of the cases following. Britton J." took
the view that a declaration might be implied from the preamble to a
statute. However on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada'2 the
court divided on this point. Davies and Sedgewick JJ. held without
3
deciding that:'
Such a declaration is not, I think, one which might be spelled out of the
charter granted or inferred merely from its terms or deduced from
recitals of the promoters in the preamble, but one substantially enacted
by Parliament.
78 Of course, it is accepted that their intent has no legal sIgnificance.
Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway Co., [1912] 1 D.L.R. 681 (P.C.) at
pp. 686-7
paraphrasing A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Dom., [1896] A.C. 348.
9
Re Perini Ltd. v. Can.-Met. Explorations (1959), 15 D.L.R. (2d.) 375
(Ont. A.C.) at pp. 379-80.
1oR.S.C. 1952, c. 11.
11
Ontario Power Co. of Niagara Falls v. Hewson (1903), 6 O.L.R. 11,
affirmed (1904), 8 O.L.R. 88.
12 (1905), 36 Can. S.C.R. 596.
131bid, pp. 605-6.
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Eleven years later, Lord Buckmaster treated the issue as important
but undecided.14 The last case dealing specifically with this topic is
St. John and Quebec Railway Co. v. Jones.1 5 Here, the majority of
the court followed the judgment of Davies J., as he then was, in the
Ontario Powers Co. case,1 6 holding that Parliament must make a
formal and explicit declaration to satisfy the requirements of 10 (c).17
Practically speaking, Parliament has avoided this problem by explicit
declarations in cases were it has sought to extend its authority.
A cognate problem is the degree of precision required of the
declaration i.e. may a declaration be made in general terms, covering
a broad class of works, or need a detailed list of works be expressly
included in the declaration? This in turn involves the further problem of whether a declaration can cover works not yet in existence
by including them in a general class. Again, if a general declaration
is void, the question arises as to the validity of specific declarations
covering works in contemplation but not in existence.
This issue came squarely before the Supreme Court in Luscar
Collieries Ltd. v. McDonald1 8 where the majority of the court, Anglin
C.J., Idington, Duff, Rinfret JJ. held a declaration in general terms
to be invalid. On apbeal, 19 the Privy Council decided the case on
grounds other than 92(10) (c), and held that the applicability and
construction of 10 (c) was left open.20 In not supporting the Supreme
Court's holding on this point, a holding which is carefully expounded,
the Privy Council more than leaves the issue open. However, as in the
problem of implied declarations, Parliament may readily enumerate
the works which compose the class over which it desires jurisdiction.21 However, it seems rather circuitous to require such enumeration when Parliament can in general terms readily make clear its
intent.
22
If we consider closely some of the reasons in the Luscar case
for a narrow approach to declarations and contrast therewith the
significant matters become apparreasoning of the minority, several
23
ent. Idington J. pointed out:

The said assumption of authority if upheld, I respectfully submit, would
leave it open to Parliament to assume control of all our highways, all our
elevators, all our local hydro electric systems, now existent or hereafter
14 Hamilton, Crimsby & Beamsville Railway Co. v. A.-G. Ont. et al., [1916]
2 A.C. 583.
15 (1921), 62 Can. S.C.R. 92.
16 Supra, footnote 11.

17 From the cases holding that a declaration must be specific, one may
d fortiori argue that a declaration cannot be implied as opposed to formal.
1- [1925] 3 D.L.R. 225 (S.C. of Can.).

[1927] A.C. 925.
o
Supra, footnote 19, per Lord Waddington.
21
e.g., Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C. 1952.
19
2

22

Supra, footnote 18.
23 Ibid. at pp. 466-7.
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to come into existence; all our local public utilities, which have become
so manifold, especially in some of our western Provinces, and which
would include telephone systems and, if I mistake not, telegraph systems;
and all the sidings and switches I have adverted to above, built by manufacturers for their own personal service and benefit, but operated by the
railway to which they gave their transportation business, and perhaps
preference in cases of competition, and in such cases possibly to a
Dominion railway and alternating to a local railway, by simply passing
a declaratory Act as to their being for the general advantages of Canada.
I cannot follow all the possible consequences of such a holding,
or of its manifold implications.
I cannot assume that any such consequences, or anything like
thereto, were ever expected to ensue upon or flow from any single enactment by the Parliament of Canada pretended to have been made
within the meaning of the reservation of s. 92(10) (c) of said B.N.A. Act,
and thereby to fulfil its requirements for a declaration as to any works
for the general advantage of Canada.
Indeed I submit that it was in order to avoid any possibility of such
like results that the said s-s. 10c was framed as it was, and so remains.
Subsections (a) and (b) of said s-s. 10 deal with works which can
safely be classified and are dealt with accordingly, but beyond that the
framers of the B.N.A. Act apparently felt they could not proceed by the
classification process, and hence proceeded to deal with the residue of
what could not be so properly dealt with by the classification process;
by entrusting said residue by s-s. c to the Parliament of Canada, on
which it cast the onus of deciding whether or not anything further could
properly be declared to be a work for the general advantage of Canada.
In other words it seems to me quite clear that Parliament was entrusted with the quasi-judicial duty of determining, after hearing all
those concerned, whether or not a specific work, either before or after
its execution, could properly be declared to be for the general advantage
of Canada, or of two or more of its Provinces.
24
Duff J. adds further objection:

The grounds on which it can be argued that s. 6(c) of the Railway Act
does not constitute a valid declaration within s. 92(10) (c) of the B.N.A.
Act, can be very concisely stated. The object of this provision, it is said,
was not to enable the Dominion to take away jurisdiction from the Provinces in respect of a given class of potential works; that is to say,
which are not in existence, which may never come into existence, and
the execution of which is not in contemplation; the purpose of the provision is rather to enable the Dominion to assume control over specific
existing works, or works the execution of which is in contemplation. The
control intended to be vested in the Dominion is the control over the
execution of the work, and over the executed work. If a declaration in
respect of all works comprised within a generic description be competent,
the necessary consequence would appear to be that, with regard to the
class of works designated by the description, provincial jurisdiction would
be excluded, although Dominion jurisdiction might never be exercised,
and although no work answering the description should ever come into
existence.
Mignault J. in favour of the wide declaration stated succinctly:2
And it would seem as unreasonable as it would be impracticable to
require that each time a provincial line is operated by a Dominion
company a special declaration should be made by Parliament. The
policy or the reason for the declaration is a matter for the consideration
of Parliament alone.
This then appears to be the crux of the objection: has Parliament
truly acted in the best interests of Canada in making a declaration?
24 Ibid. at p. 476.
25 Ibid. at

pp. 484-5.
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Idington J. in this particular case thought not.26 However, while the
learned judge cannot control or overturn Parliament's discretion once
it has actually declared on this ground, 27 he can and does demand that
Parliament carry out the "quasi-judicial duty" of considering carefully whether a "specific" work should be the subject of a declaration.28 In other words, by demanding that Parliament specifically
enumerate each desired work, each separately named work has the
dignity of at least individual consideration, and new uncontemplated
works as they arise will necessitate a fresh declaration. All this
seeks to satisfy the standard and wish embodied in the words of Sir
Mathise Tellier C.J.Q.: 29
No doubt, the Parliament of Canada has the power to declare, in an Act,
that a certain enterprise, although entirely situate in the Province is for
the general advantage of Canada; but it is presumed that in practice it
uses this power with a wise discretion.
However, there seems to be no cogent reason why Parliament
should not be free to consider an entire class of works, for example,
railways, of advantage to the Dominion or two or more of the Provinces. Thus, in the words of Mignault J. :30
Expressing now the opinion which I have formed after full considera-

tion, it seems obvious that if Parliament can declare for the general
advantage of Canada a specified work, it can also, in one declaration,
comprise several works having the same distinguishing characteristics,
or a class of works sufficiently described so as to leave no doubt as to the
identity of each member of the class, as coming within the description
of the enactment.

As long as the declaration is sufficiently detailed there is no reason
why it should not as well cover works not in existence at the time the
declaration is made. 31 And, as Newcombe J. points out:32
While of course care must be taken to see that the declaration is not
uncertain, the general maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest would
apply.
2

6 Ibid. p. 470, "Of course it is rather like reducing the phrase 'A Work
for the General Advantage of Canada' to a point of ridicule, to bring thereunder the 5% or 5% miles of spur lines .

.

. where collieries seem to be

numerous."
27
cf. Lord Watson's judgment in Union Oolliery Co. v. Bryden, [1899)
A.C. 581 at p. 585: "In assigning legislative power to one or the other of
these parliaments it is not made a statutory condition that the exercise of
such power shall be, in the opinion of a court of law, discreet. In so far as
they possess legislative jurisdiction, the discretion committed to the parliaments, whether of Dominion or of the provinces, is unfettered ....

"

It is

of course arguable that the learned judge here deals with a situation where
the question of discretion arises after jurisdiction has been ascertained, while
in the case of 10(c) the question of discretion is a condition precedent to the
assumption of jurisdiction.
28One might also argue that the court is free to determine whether or
not a work over which Parliament asserts jurisdiction is of national importance without considering whether the declaration deals wisely with that
work. However, perhaps this, as Professor Laskin would put it, is "a distinction
2 9 without a difference."
Quebec Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Quebec and Desnoyers (1940),
53 C.R.T.C.
115 at p. 132.
30
Luscar case, supra, footnote 18, at page 483.
31
Beauport
v. Que. R.L. & P. Co. (1941), 53 C.R.T.C. 174.
32
Luscar case, supra, footnote 18, at pp. 491-2.
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The key question in considering the scope of 10(c) is of course
the meaning of the term "works" as used in the section, for while
procedural controls, or roadblocks, may be useful, they are by their
very nature inadequate and at best a temporary hurdle. Basically,
the question has been whether "works" as found in 10(c) is used in
the same sense and scope as in 10 (a) so that in 10 (c) it is cut down
by amy limitations placed on it in 10 (a). That is to say, if in 10 (a)
the conjunction of "works" with "undertakings" narrows the applicability of "works", then in 10(c) "works" will have an equally
narrow characterization, without the compensatory conjunction with
"undertakings", and the broad field the two terms combined can
cover. Further, the very same analysis may apply to the conjunction
of "works" and "undertakings" in the very opening words of 92(10)
itself.
Lord Atkinson in an imprecise reference to s. 92(10) stated,33
"These works are physical things, not services". Clarifying the exact
reference, Viscount Dunedin surmised that the use of "works" in
10(c) is other than in 10 (a) and that the meaning of works in (c)
is physical things in contradiction to "undertakings" which is "not a
physical thing but is an arrangement under which of course physical
things are used."34 Referring to Cannon J.35 who assumed that Lord
Atkinson's equation of "works" and "physical things" applied to all
of s. 92(10), Viscount Dunedin held this definition applied only to
92(10) (c). On the other hand, this definition of "undertakings"
applies to the whole of head (10). 3 6. It would appear then, from
these cases that while "works" in 10 (c) is limited to physical things,
"works" in 10(a) is not so restricted. Logically, it would seem the
converse would be more reasonable inasmuch as "works" in 10(a)
is accompanied by "undertakings" which would by definition cover
the usage of the "works", while in 10(c) "works" stands alone without the crutch of "undertakings", and one would think that by itself
its meaning would be broader. When one further considers that
"undertakings" has been defined not only as "an arrangement under
which . . . physical things are used" but as interchangeable with

"enterprise" and as equivalent to "organizations", 3 7 the scope of
the emasculation of the concept "works" when one subtracts therefrom "undertakings" becomes apparent.38 A priori, there seems to
be no intrinsically compelling reason why Parliament should be entrusted with the power of declaration over physical things but not
over their usage, organization and the like, particularly when the
criterion as stated by statute is "the general advantage of Canada
33
34 Sup'ra, at p. 685.
Re Regulation and
35

Control of Radio Communication, [19311 S.C.R. 541.
Re Aerial Navigation, [19311 1 D.L.R. 13 (S.C. of Can.) at p. 50.
See Rand J. in Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd., [19511 S.C.R. 887
at p.3 921.
7 Discussed in Reference Re Industrial Relations and Disputes Investi36

gation
3 8 Act, [19551 S.C.R. 529.

For a more detailed account of the interaction of 92(10) (a) and 10(c),
see the thorough analysis of Vincent C. MacDonald, [19341 1 D.L.R. 1 pp. 9-15
and pp. 25-31.
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or for the advantage of two or more of the provinces". Further, it
requires a distinction of some nicety to differentiate between what
ground is included in the control and regulation of the work per se,
and what is included in the forbidden ground of the organization,
or arrangements under which the work is employed. For example,
when does control over grain elevators which are works and therefore within the jurisdiction of Parliament by declaration encroach
on the undertaking of the grain business? 39 If it be argued that the
courts will here apply the doctrine of the necessarily incidental, the
task will be indeed delightful; in point of fact, works are generally
incidental to an undertaking rather than the undertaking to a work.
Thus, any attempt to carve out of the regulation of an undertaking
that which pertains of necessity to the regulation of the work
(which in turn exists because of its importance to the undertaking)
is bound to result in a highly artificial distinction, not necessarily
"for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two
or more of the provinces".
Another line of cases also offers itself for consideration. In
R. v. Red Line Ltd.4 0 Orde J.A. held that "works" in 10(c) had no
relation to "works" in 10 (a):
There is no grammatical connection whatsoever ... If there is any
restriction upon Parliament's power to make that declaration in any
particular case, it must be sought for in exception (c) itself, and not by
any reference to exception (a).
Thus, it would appear that in this view the scope of "works" as
used in 10(c) is not cut down by inference from 10(a) and hence
analytically at any rate may include "undertakings" as defined by
Viscount Dunedin. 41 This view is in harmony with the doctrine of
Rand J.:4
Undertakings existing without works, do not appear within s. 92(10) (c)
and cannot be the subject of such a declaration.
In other words, undertakings existing with works can be the subject
of such declaration. So too, Lord Porter 3 in holding that 92(10) (c)
embraces a wider subject matter than "works" which are also
"undertakings" seems to imply that "works" in 10(c) includes
"undertakings".
O'Halloran J.A. in a dissenting judgment 44 seems to summarize
the gist of argument in favour of a wide interpretation of "works"
39
cf. Duff J. in King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Company, [1925]
S.C.R. 434 at p. 447: "There is one way in which the Dominion may acquire
authority to regulate a local work such as an elevator; and that is, by a
declaration properly framed under s. 92(10) of the B.N.A. Act."
40 (1930), 66 O.L.R. 53.
41cf. Lord Porter in A.-G. Ont. v. Winner, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 657 (P.C.) at p.
670: "Moreover in ss. (10) (c) the word 'works' is found uncombined with the
word 'undertakings', a circumstance which leads to the inference that the
words are to be read disjunctively...." Here an inference is drawn from
10(c) to 10(a) rather than as customary from 10(a) to 10(c), either process
being42 contrary to R. v. Red Line (supra).
Supra, footnote 41, at page 553.
43
A.-G. Ont. 'v. Winner, supra,footnote 41, at pp. 670-1.
44
Reference Re Application of Hours of Work Act to C.P.R. Hotel
Employees, [19471 2 D.L.R. 723 (B.C. C.A.) at pp. 726-7.
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in 10(c). He took the view that "works" as used in 10(c) denotes
the "works and undertakings" "referred to in cl. (a) and c. (b) of
head (10) ".45 ". . Parliament never intended the language of head
(10) of s. 92 to receive a rigid and purely verbal construction .
The position may be summed up in the learned judge's words:
In the first line of head (10) of s. 92 the words "works and undertakings"
are used as descriptive of a genus. Unfortunately, in cl. (a)and cl. (c)
of head (10) the word "works" is inadroitly used in the sense of a
subordinate classification of the genus "works and undertakings".

Aside from the cases just discussed, there are more indirect
considerations of this problem inferrable from judicial language in the
reported cases. Thus, for example, in Reference Re Water Powers46
Duff J. stated in regard to Parliament's declaratory power:
and the basis and condition of its actions must be the decision by
Parliament that the "work or undertaking" or class of works or undertakings affected by that action is "for the general advantage of Canada",
or of two or more of the Provinces; which decision must be evidenced
and authenticated by a solemn declaration, in that sense, by Parliament
itself.
In R. v. Red Line4 7 Riddell J.A. paraphrases:
By sec. 92(10) of the B.N.A. Act local works and undertakings ... such
..
as... are before or after their execution declared by the Parliament

of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada....

More recently, in Van Buren Bridge Co. v. Madawaska,4s Ritchie

J. A. referred to the plaintiff as " . .. carrying on an undertaking
declared to be for the general good of Canada". Again in Re Perini
Ltd. v. Can.-Met. Explorations49 Landreville J. stated, in paraphrasing the words of Lord Watson in (.P.R. v. Parish of Notre Dame
Bonsecours:50
. . .The B.N.A. Act, whilst it gives the legislative control of certain
works and undertakings for the general advantage of Canada to the
Parliament of the Dominion....
This brief and incomplete sampling of judicial language may indicate
either that the expressions used were per incuriam or that the learned
judges have assumed without more that "works" in 10(c) is equivalent to "works and undertakings".
If there is a valid and binding distinction between "works"
and "undertakings", it is arguable that this limitation on "works"
in 10(c) may be overcome by a parliamentary tour de force. What,
in other words, is to prevent Parliament in its infinite wisdom from
declaring an undertaking to be a work? 51 Where this was done in
45
Note that O'Halloran J.A. here utilizes cl. (a) and cl. (b) to enlarge
cl. (c) rather than restrict it, a rather novel twist. Of. Annotation, supra,
footnote 38, at p. 29. "It is thus apparent that it is a crucial determinant of
the meaning of 'works' in cl. (c) to hold that it is the same as in cl. (a) for
so to do may be to restrict its meaning materially."
46 [1929] S.C.R. 200 at p. 220. Note also the emphasis on a "solemn
declaration".
47
4

Supra, footnote 40.

8 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 770.

49

Supra, footnote 9.

50 [1899] A.C. 367.
51 e.g., IndustriaZ ReZations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952.
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the case of the private act incorporating the London and Lake Erie
Railway and TransportationCompany52 neither Boyd C.53 nor Meredith C.J.O. questioned this feature of the declaration. 54 So too, in
55 Rinfret J.echoed the words of
Beauport v. Que. R.L. and P. Co.,
56
stated:
which
statute
the incorporating
1. The undertaking of the Quebec, Montmorency and Charlevoix Rail.
way Company, a body incorporated as mentioned in the preamble and
hereinafter called "the Company", is hereby declared to be a wori for
the general advantage of Canada"

and said,
The undertaking of the company was, therefore, "declared to be a work
for the general advantage of Canada"; ...(Italics are mine).

It is this approach that is the nightmare that confronts those who
would uphold provincial autonomy in the face of what they consider
the unwarranted unilateral expansion of the Federal Parliament's
authority and jurisdiction. Thus writes R. H. McKercher: 57
The technique of legislative draftsmanship whereby Parliament's legislative jurisdiction is apparently sought to be unduly extended is obvibus.
The method is simply one of defining, within a particular statute, an
"undertaking" to be a "work". Once it becomes a "Work" then it is open
to the Dominion to assume control over it. To allow this surreptitious
technique to stand would amount to allowing Parliament to define not
only its own legislative jurisdiction but also that of the provinces as
well.

It is this basic concern that appears to lie behind the demands that
10(c) be strictly construed, that declarations be explicit and formal,
and that "works" in 10(c) be other than "undertakings". Something
of this approach, may perhaps be found in the words of Rand J.:58
There is towards them also (i.e., railways and telegraphs) a notion of
fixity and determinateness that, although somewhat elusive, underlies
the restriction of a declaration of Dominion advantage under head 10(c)
to a "work". But the building up of an aggregate of services into a
unity of operation introduces considerations of a different nature.

We may, it would appear, infer that "works" as used in 10(c) has a
limiting determinate character, so that this concept would not include "undertakings" which appears to be closer to "an aggregate

of services".
It is of course open for the courts to apply the doctrine of
colourability so as to prevent Parliament's expansion by definition.
The application of the doctrine would presuppose that "works" does
not include "undertakings" and would necessitate a detailed demarcation between the two concepts; the courts would have to decide
whether the terms are mutually exclusive, disjunctive or conjunctive,
that "undertakings" is provincial in aspect or in whole. In short,
52 9-10 Ed. VII, c. 120, s. 2.
53

Kerley v. London and Lake Erie TransportationCo. (1912), 6 D.L.R. 189.

(Ont.).
54 Ibid. (1913), 13 D.L.R. 365 (Ont. C.A.).
55 [1945] S.C.R. 16.
56 58-59 Vict., c. 59.
57

Parliament'sDeclaratoryPower (1955), 20 Sask. B. Rev. 3 at p. 8.

58 Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern)Ltd.,'supra,footnote 41, at p. 923.
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the courts would have to consider carefully and minutely an area
which, till now at any rate, has been generally glossed over.
Another question regarding declarations that has come before
the courts is the question of their necessity. 10(c) speaks of
works "wholly situate within the province", while 10(a) deals with
works and undertakings "connecting the Province with any other
or others of the Provinces or extending beyond the limits of the
Provinces." Thus in Toronto Corporationv. Bell Telephone Company
of Canada,5 9 Lord Macnaughton, speaking on behalf of the Privy
Council, stated with regard to the Dominion-wide works of the Bell
Telephone Company:
It is not very easy to see what the part of the section declaring the Act
of incorporation to be for the general advantage of Canada means. As
regards the works therein referred to, if they had been "wholly situate
within the province", the effect would have been to give exclusive jurisdiction over them to the Parliament of Canada; but, inasmuch as the
works and undertaking of the company authorized by the Act of incorporation were not confined within the limits of the province, this part
of the declaration seems to be unmeaning.

So too, in C.P.R. v. A.-G. B.C.60 Rand J. said:
Under head (10) (c) a work must be wholly confined within one province
...to be the subject of a declaration.

Accordingly, a railway cannot be the subject of a declaration for it
is not wholly situate within the province. The Dominion, however,
frequently persists in adding a superfluous declaration ex abundanti
1
cautela.6
This was the case, for example, in Van Buren Bridge Co.
v. Madawaska6 2 where a bridge connecting New Brunswick and
Maine was the subject of a declaration. Ritchie J.A. referred to the
bridge without commenting on the declaration, in the following

words:
I can see no interference with the operation of an inter-connecting undertaking extending beyond the limits of the Province and a work for the
general advantage of Canada.

It is fairly obvious that the declaration by itself was unmeaning,
unless we are prepared to3 argue that it applied only to the half of
6
the bridge in the province.

Given a declaration over an appropriate subject matter, in
proper language and precision, what exactly does a declaration do?
Even on this apparently elementary question there is no unanimity
59 [1905] A.C. 52 at p. 60.
60 [19481 S.C.R. 373, at p. 397.
61 Thus making the construction of 92(10) (c) an unnecessary task for the
court. Of course, it would in principle be just as easy for the court to overlook the other issues and deal with the declaration.
62

63

Supra, footnote 6, at p. 70.
of. Rand J.'s qualification in O.P.J.

v. A.-G. B.C., supra, footnote 60,
where in referring to the inefficacy of a declaration upon a railway running
cross-Canada he stated,
. so far as they purport to deal with railways as
a whole."
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of opinion. In Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway C0.64 Lord Atkinson held that:
The effect of sub.-sec. 10 of sec. 92 of the British North America Act Is,
their Lordships think, to transfer the excepted works mentioned in subheads (a), (b), and (c) of it into sec. 91, and thus to place them under
the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Dominion Parliament.
These two sections must then be read and construed as if these transferred subjects were especially enumerated in sec. 91, and local railways
as distinct from federal railways were specifically enumerated In sec. 92.

A similar view was expressed by Viscount Dunedin in the Radio
case:

65

These provisions as have been explained in several judgments of the
Board have the effect of reading the excepted matters into the preferential place enjoyed by the enumerated subjects of s. 91....

With respect, it must be noted that these judgments gloss over
and fail to take account of a very basic distinction between 10(a)
and 10 (b) on the one hand, and 10 (c) on the other. The former two
sections exclude from the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures
works and undertakings which by their nature as defined within
the sections are, without more, subject to federal legislative authority. In the case of works covered by 10(c) the matter is otherwise,
for the section merely gives Parliament the power to make a declaration. Until the declaration is made, however, the local works remain
as much a part of the provincial domain as any other subject dealt
with by s. 92.66 In other words, it is not the effect of 92(10) which
transfers "works" in 10(c) into s. 91; it is Parliament's declaration
6s
that effects this change. 67 Duff J. in Reference Re Water Powers

articulated this distinction by referring to the jurisdiction arising
from 92(10) (c) as not a jurisdiction given directly by the British
North America Act itself, but rather as given:
mediately through the instrumentality of declarations by the Parliament
of Canada under s. 92(10) (c).
A subordinate, but related, question is the meaning of "exclusively" as used in reference to Parliament's jurisdiction over interpolated 10(c) works. In A.-G. Ont. v. Winner 69 Lord Porter, aside
64

Supra, footnote 8, at p. 685.

65 Supra, footnote 34, at p. 85.
66 It is also open for Parliament to vary, cancel or modify any of its

declarations: Hamilton, Grimsby v. A.-G. Ont., supra, footnote 14.
67Lord Atkinson, in Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway Co., supra,
footnote 8, at p. 687 went on to say, "The only one of the heads enumerated
in sec. 91 dealing expressly or impliedly with railways is that which is interpolated by the transfer into it of sub-heads (a), (b), and (c), of sub-sec. 10
of sec. 92." The question arises: What is interpolated, the actual sub-sections
or what they deal with? Previously, Lord Atkinson held, "the excepted
works mentioned in sub-heads (a), (b), and (c)" to be the matters transferred. If the entire sub-sections are transferred, the problem of 10(c) arises.
If only the works and undertakings dealt with are transferred, then they
are given unique status in that every particular work taken to the Dominion
by declaration becomes an independent sub-head of s. 91 of the British North
America
Act.
68
Supra,footnote 46, at p. 219.
69
S upra, footnote 41, at p. 666.
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from reaffirming Montreal v. Montreal Street R. (o.70 held the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament over 10(a), (b) and (c), the
same as:
...
they would have enjoyed if the exceptions were in terms inserted as
one of the classes of subjects assigned to it under s. 91.
It appears then, that the Dominion's "exclusive jurisdiction and
control" over these interpolated heads is no more or less than
over the other heads of s. 91.71 In other words, the same principles
of interpretation as apply to all the other heads of s. 91 here too
apply.
But in the case of subjects of declarations, there is a logical
difficulty. Until the declaration, the specific work would be by s.
92(10) under provincial jurisdiction and therefore subject to provincial laws. By the declaration, the said work becomes subject to
Parliament's laws. It would appear, therefore, that in the case of
10(c) there is a built-in conflict between Dominion and Provincial
legislation inasmuch as, aside from the all-important declaration,
the work involved is a local work. In such a case, how far does
federal legislation override provincial legislation? Does the doctrine
of the "unoccupied field" apply or is the province completely cut
out once a declaration is made? If the latter is the true position
then 92(10) (c) as read into s. 91 will have a position favoured over
the rest of s. 91 which is cut down by the heads of jurisdiction
found in s. 92.
An examination of the cases in this area is very revealing. In
C.P.R. v. Parish of Notre Dame de Bonsecours,72 Lord Watson discussed the effect of a declaration upon a railway in the following
words:
The British North America Act, whilst it gives the legislative control of the appellants' railway qua railway to the Parliament of
the Dominion, does not declare that the railway shall cease to be part
of the provinces in which it is situated, or that it shall, in other respects,
be exempted from the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. Accordingly, the Parliament of Canada has, in the opinion of their Lordships,
exclusive right to prescribe regulations for the construction, repair, and
alteration of the railway, and for its management, and to dictate the
constitution and powers of the company; but it is, inter alia, reserved
to the provincial parliament to impose direct taxation upon those portions
of it which are within the province, in order to the raising of a revenue
for provincial purposes.
In this case, municipal legislation prescribing the cleaning of a ditch
was held to be intra vires. In Madden v. Nelson and Fort Sheppard
Railway73 the above principle was reaffirmed, but it was held that
provincial legislation prescribing the erection of proper fences on a
railway on penalty of responsibility for cattle injured or killed was
ultra vires of the provincial legislature. The distinction drawn by the
Lord Chancellor between the cases appears to be the fact that in the
70
i.e., the aspect of it discussed above.
71 See the argument of Mr. Arnup in Re PeriniLtd. v. Can.-Met. Explorations supra,footnote 49.
F2 [1899) A.C. 367 at p. 372.
73 [1899] A.C. 626.
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J.P.R. case, the legislation was of a general nature aimed at all landowners, while in the Madden case, the legislation was aimed specifically at the railway.7 4 Both judgments recognize the fact that "exclusively" means no more exclusively than the jurisdiction of Parliament
over the other sections of head 91.
In Beauport v. Que. R.L.P. Co.75 the view was held that when
a railway carries on activities in an area not covered by federal law,
provincial law applies.. So long as Parliament does not utilize the
jurisdiction which it has taken to itself, valid provincial legislation
remains in force, in an unoccupied field. On the other hand, Kellock
J. in Reference Re Industrial Relations 76 found it unnecessary:
To consider whether, so far as s. 92(10) is concerned, such legislation
as the present would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament
or whether ...provincial legislation covering the same ground would be
operative in the absence of Dominion legislation.

In the light of the Beauport case, and in the light of In Re Treaty of
Versailles,77 Kellock J. appears to cast some doubt on the unoccupied
field approach in this area. Relying on C.P.R. v. Notre Dame de
Bonsecours7s where Lord Watson stated:

The Parliament of Canada has in the opinion of their Lordships exclusive
right to prescribe regulations for the construction, repair, and alteration
of the railway, and for its management, and to dictate the constitution
and powers of the company.
Kellock J. went on to say: 79
If the matter dealt with by the legislation in question on this Reference
can therefore be said to fall within the scope of management of the
undertakings excepted by s. 92(10), there would be no room for provincial legislation on the same subject matter with relation to such an
undertaking, whether the field had or had not been occupied. (Italics
are mine).

Thus, even if the issue is left open, it appears that in the view of
Kellock J. there are areas where the "unoccupied field" theory has
no application.
Locke J.80 avoids the question of an unoccupied field by pointing
out that in this particular case Parliament had legislated. He does,
however, point out the opposition between the statement of Duff J.81
74 This objection could readily be overcome by a more generalized statute

dealing with fencing, omitting the pointed preamble. Both cases appear to
be dealing with the regulation of railway property so as to preserve valid
provincial
interests, but not with the railway qua railway.
75
footnote 31.
7 6 Supra,
Supra, footnote 37, at

p. 557.

77 [1925] S.C.R. 505 at p. 511, where Duff J. held that, "The effect of

such legislation by the Dominion to execution of this power is that provincial
authority in relation to the subject matter of such legislation is superseded,
and remains inoperative so long as the Dominion legislation continues in
force." On this case because the Dominion had not legislated beyond a
specific enactment, Duff J. held, ".

.

. the primary authority of the Province

in relation to the subject matter remains, subject to the qualification mentioned,
unimpaired and unrestricted."
7
s Supra, footnote 72, at p. 372.
7
9 Supra, footnote 37 at p. 557.
8o Ibid. at p. 577.
81 Quoted in footnote 77.
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and that of Lord Watson in Union Colliery Ltd. v. Bryden
Lord Watson stated:

15
2

where

The abstinence of the Dominion Parliament from legislating to the full
limit of its powers could not have the effect of transferring to any
provincial legislature the legislative power assigned to the Dominion by
s. 91 of the Act of 1867.83
Considering that the legislative power involved is power that the
Dominion gave itself by declaration, this statement would allow the
Dominion to place an area of control in limbo, in a forbidden category, by making a declaration over a particular work and not legislating on that work. The clash of the two quotations highlights the
unique position of jurisdiction shifted by utilization of 10 (c) inasmuch
as, if we accept the unoccupied field approach because of the essential
difference between this interpolated part of s. 91 and the rest of
s. 91, there will always be provincial legislation ready for application
if the Dominion does not utilize its jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if we treated interpolated 10(c) as any other part of s. 91, there is
the danger that valid provincial interests will be overlooked.
This question has its practical ramifications in the consideration
of the status of any provincial legislation when the Dominion removes
its declaration, or even, for that matter, narrows it. If the "unoccupied field" theory with its concomitant concept of dormant provincial
legislation is applicable, then any surrender by the Federal Parliament
of authority by declaration would instantaneously revive the dormant
provincial legislation. On the other hand, if we take the view that
a declaration nullifies provincial legislation applicable to the work
before the declaration, then of necessity the province would be obligated to repass desirable legislation.
Other cases have taken a quite pragmatic view of the problem
and applied the "aspect doctrine" and the "doctrine of the necessarily
incidental". Thus in Beauport v. Que. R.L.P. Co.8 4 Kerwin J. held
that:
...the "works" being considered an enumerated head of s. 91, Parliament may enact such further legislation as is necessarily incidental to
the exercise of its jurisdiction over them....
Thus Kerwin J. treats the new heads of s. 91 as any other section,
applying thereto the doctrine of the "necessarily incidental" so as to
allow the Dominion to reach s. 92 matters. However, in applying this
doctrine, Kerwin J. by implication overrules not only any blanket
supremacy of Parliament over 92(10) (c) works, but also any vestiges
of survival of pre-declaration provincial laws per se.
A recent judgment of Landreville J. is also worth considering
85
on this topic. In Re Perini Ltd. v. Can.-Met. Explorations
the
s2
Supra, footnote 27, at p. 588.
83
See too, Postal Reference case, [1948] S.C.R. 248 and Burrard Power
Co. Ltd.
84 v. King, [1911] A.C. 87.
Supra, footnote 31.
85 Supra, footnote 9.
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learned judge held with regard to the application of Mechanics' Liens
to the subjects of a declaration, that the declaration does not derrogate from provincial legislative jurisdiction except to the extent of
enabling the Dominion to reach matters "necessarily incidental".
92(10) (c), he held, did not declare such works should cease to be
part of the province or exempt from valid provincial legislation.
Thus Landreville J. held that provincial works under a declaraof the declaration become immune to
tion do not simply 8because
6
provincial legislation.
. . . It imposes itself that if the Dominion legislates on works or
undertakings which are for the general advantage of Canada, It must
express itself in clearly discernible manner as to its main purpose and
object. When such is unequivocally defined it may then be a matter
of interpretation to what extent other fields of legislation are ancillary
or incidentally affected but necessary for the effective existence of the
Dominion Act....
His reason for this construction is pithily stated:
In the case of works which are strictly and wholly within the confines
of a Province, to construe otherwise would be to render inoperative
many, if not all, laws enacted by the Province which have even remotely
some effect on the works.

Whether this last point is a valid constitutional argument or not, it
finds echo in many an earlier case.8 7
This, then, is our present situation. It is fairly obvious that
except for a few elementary matters, the broad sweep of 10(c) is
as much open to interpretation and clarification in our day as it

was in 1934, when Vincent C. MacDonald wrote: 88

t . . The proper construction of s. 92(10)-and particularly of cl. (c)
thereof, upon which the power of Parliament to declare works to be for
the general advantage depends-is a task requiring the exercise of the
highest gifts of judicial statesmanship. It is to be hoped that the Court
which is confronted by such a task will approach it with not too much
regard to the mechanistic application of canons appropriate to ordinary
statutes but rather with regard to the fact-ever-present to the mind of
the great Marshall-that it is a Constitution they are expounding.
With the growth of Canada, and the accompanying enlargement
of her political and economic problems, these theoretical doctrinal
dissertations will become pressing, practical considerations. In this
process, the Dominion will no doubt be more and more tempted to
utilize 10(c) in cases where, till now, political considerations may
have restrained. It will be interesting to see what will be the future
development of this section.

86 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 380.
878cf. Lord Watson in A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Dom., supra, footnote 3.
8 Supra, footnote 38, at p. 31.

